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Abstract 
 
The main transportation issues facing cities today fall into familiar categories– congestion and 
public transit. But the emerging needs in each area are quite different than those most widely 
understood and commonly analyzed. 
 
For congestion, there is now a far richer menu of options that are understood, technically 
feasible, and perhaps politically feasible. This is accounted for by several factors: 
∏ Product differentiation: One can now contemplate offering roads of different qualities and 
prices, and allowing users to choose. 
∏ Privatization: Many selected road segments are now operated by the private sector. 
Transportation officials are keenly interested due to financial constraints. 
∏ Attitudes toward pricing: Road pricing is routinely considered in planning exercises, and 
field experiments have made it more familiar to urban voters. 
∏ Goods movement: Urban trucking has grown in its environmental effects and links to the 
urban economic base, especially in port cities. One result is serious interest in tolled truck-
only express highways. 
 
For public transit, several similar factors call for changes in policy: 
∏ The dominance of large public transit agencies has led to an undesirable homogenization of 
service. There is a need for political mechanisms to allow each type of transit to specialize 
where it is strongest. 
∏ The spread of “bus rapid transit” has opened new possibilities for providing the advantages 
of rail transit at lower cost. 
∏ The prospect of pricing and privatizing highway facilities could reduce the amount of 
subsidy needed to maintain a healthy transit system. 
∏ Privately operated public transit is making a comeback in other parts of the world. Lessons 
there may offer pointers for the US. 
 
The single most positive step toward better urban transportation would be to encourage the 
spread of road pricing. A second step, more speculative because it has not been researched, 
would be to use more environmentally-friendly road designs that provide needed capacity but at 
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  Cities exist and thrive because they enable people to access each other. Thus they depend on 
a good transportation system, as confirmed by the strong impacts of transportation infrastructure 
on both economic growth (Gramlich 1994) and urban structure (Giuliano 2004). Furthermore, 
there is little doubt that, at least in a city of any size, a healthy economy requires a transportation 
system that includes both private and public modes, since neither alone can possibly 
accommodate the enormous variety of trips that such an economy generates. Each mode involves 
important policy decisions about the extent of capital investment, the level of service provided, 
and the financing and pricing of that service. 
  Given its importance, it is no surprise that transportation is often a top concern to urban 
residents. Periodically this concern rises in prominence as one or another part of the system 
appears to be near breakdown. The high labor intensity of public transportation, combined with a 
variety of pressures toward more dispersed trip patterns, subject it to severe cost pressures that 
occasionally erupt in service cutbacks or unsustainable fiscal drains. Meanwhile traffic 
congestion on highways, inherent in urban life but never really accepted, continues its steady 
march toward an apparently intolerable future. Adverse environmental effects of traffic, and of 
the activities that support it, just add to unease about the health of the underlying system which 
depends so strongly on motor vehicles. 
  Often the reaction to both of these problems is to propose infusion of funds into public 
transit. Whatever the wisdom of this approach for ameliorating the fiscal problems of transit, 
experience indicates that it can have at best a very small effect on traffic congestion. Yet 
highways carry the overwhelming majority of urban trips in virtually all metropolitan areas. 
Therefore, realistic planners typically look to highway capacity enhancements as the main 
weapon against congestion. If one wants a simple explanation for why congestion is growing, it 
is not hard to find: for many decades, road capacity has grown far more slowly than vehicle-K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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miles of travel — especially in urban areas. Table 1 shows some representative figures for the 
US, covering 1980-2005. 
 
Table 1. Demand factors and supply of road capacity: US 1980-2005 
 1980 2005  Growth   
All Areas:    
Adult population (age 15+) (millions)  175.3 235.7  34.5% 
Registered motor vehicles (millions)  155.8 241.2  54.8% 
Vehicle-miles of travel (billions)  1,527.3 2,989.8  95.8% 
Lane-miles of major roads (thousands)
a 552.2 724.6  31.2% 
Urban areas:    
Vehicle-miles of travel (billions)  855.3 1,951.9  128.2% 
Lane-miles of major roads (thousands)
a 219.9 351.5  59.9% 
a “Major roads” are defined as expressways and other principal arterials. 
Sources: US FHWA (1997), Table MV-200, VM-201, HM-260; US FHWA (2006a), 
Tables MV-1, VM-2, HM-60; US Census Bureau (2006), Table 11. 
 
 
  Yet while planners are busy projecting capacity needs (often requiring hopelessly infeasible 
levels of funding) and detailing apocalyptic scenarios in case the capacity is not forthcoming, 
many analysts are pessimistic about what can be accomplished through more road capacity. 
Since World War II, enormous capacity investments have been made; they have accommodated 
an impressive growth in population, mobility, and motor-vehicle traffic in particular, but they 
have not stabilized congestion levels. Neither have transit initiatives, which have made minor if 
any inroads into the decline of transit mode share. Improved signal timing, freeway ramp 
metering, carpool lanes, transit reorganization, and land-use policies all have their effects on 
congestion, but they are small. Downs (2004) draws a stark conclusion: congestion is here to stay 
because there is only one policy — road pricing — that can stop it, and the public will not 
support road pricing. In other words, public policy is at an impasse. 
  There is a consolation: congestion is self-limiting. It can exist only because people — lots of 
them — are willing to put up with it. Discourage them enough, and they will remove themselves 
from the upward pressure of highway use. An equilibrium is thus reached in which the cost of 
travel, including users’ own time, becomes high enough that demand is kept in check. The 
trouble with this solution is that it may be a quite unhappy equilibrium, disliked by those 
affected, politically potent, and economically inefficient. Moreover, the functioning of the urban 
system, broadly conceived as an economic and cultural system aimed to provide enjoyment of 
life, is compromised. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
revised June 2007  Prepared for: Unraveling the Urban Enigma: City Prospects, City Policies  
3 
  I offer here a slightly less pessimistic view than that of Downs, focusing on some newer 
developments in transportation policy and analysis. Some of these developments make pricing 
more likely, while others broaden the comfort zone within which pricing and non-pricing 
innovations might work. While many of these developments are genuinely emerging trends, 
some are gleams in the eye of this beholder, representing possibilities that I believe are unleashed 
by emerging trends but in non-obvious ways. 
  I first consider developments related to highway congestion, then those related to public 
transit. I conclude with observations about what transportation policy could look like if things go 
well. 
 
Highway congestion and level of service 
 
Product differentiation and heterogeneous preferences 
 
  Downs’s thesis about the impossibility of serious congestion relief is formulated in the 
context of a homogeneous population. He postulates that people uniformly want to travel in 
dense areas at peak times, and have common political preferences against such possible 
ameliorative policies as regional land-use controls, elimination of housing subsidies, or road 
pricing. This is of course an abstraction, and I believe a useful one. But recent events have 
highlighted another aspect of urban life: the heterogeneity of types of users and of people’s 
preferences concerning their travel conditions. Accounting for such variety changes the terms of 
the impasse described by Downs. 
  Decades ago, urban road managers realized that a highway system’s efficiency might be 
increased by encouraging people to carpool, so that the same number of trips can be served in 
fewer cars. Thus began an extensive and still ongoing process of restricting certain expressway 
lanes to carpools. The hope was to stimulate more carpooling, which it does to a small extent. 
But the primary effect is to lower aggregate passenger travel times by offering faster service to 
those people, such as some long-distance commuters to large employment centers, who choose 
to carpool for other reasons. (To the dismay of planners, carpool lanes have also attracted family 
members, especially parents carrying children, who would not otherwise be using more than one 
motorized vehicle.) K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  The system of carpool lanes is not universally admired, especially where there is insufficient 
carpool traffic to keep an entire lane well utilized. In a few cases, carpool lanes have been 
decommissioned and returned to general use. Dahlgren (1998) notes the rather narrow range of 
parameters that lead to carpool lanes meeting commonly applied criteria for success such as high 
utilization, high level of service, and savings in aggregate travel time. 
  But interestingly, the system of carpool lanes has opened the door to a broader notion of how 
differing levels of service can be offered to people in different circumstances. In analytical terms, 
we could say that with carpool lanes, cars are differentiated by the total value of time they carry, 
on the presumption that each passenger values his or her time enough so that the aggregate value 
in a carpool is typically larger than that of a solo driver. This is a crude form of product 
differentiation, whereby two otherwise similar products (expressway travel) are offered with 
different quality levels. 
  In other realms of economic life, product differentiation is much more common and is 
usually accomplished by pricing. No one thinks twice about the option to pay more for better 
theater tickets, faster computers, nicer restaurants, or first-class seats on airplanes. But public 
services have typically not been differentiated; and the provision of infrastructure for highway 
travel, because it is typically provided by government agencies, has mistakenly been viewed as 
another public service — despite the fact that highway travel lacks the features that normally 
define public goods. 
  Recent events, motivated by quite other considerations, have expanded the idea of product 
differentiation on roads beyond carpools to paying more for better quality, just as for other 
goods. I will describe in the following subsections how this came about, so here let me just 
describe the outcome. In several US metropolitan areas, beginning with Orange County and San 
Diego (California) and Houston (Texas), express lanes were constructed or converted from 
carpool lanes and offered not only to carpools but also to solo drivers willing to pay a toll. In 
most cases the toll varied quite steeply by time of day. In each case the concept was presented as 
a modification of carpool lanes, either as an explicit conversion for the purpose of making better 
use of spare capacity in an existing carpool lane, or (in Orange County) as a substitute for 
previous plans to add a carpool lane. (In Orange County this change was not welcomed by 
neighboring Riverside County, where most of the users live, although there was a sweetener: 
users of the very congested corridor got four new express lanes instead of two). K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  These early experiments were encouraged, if belatedly, by a federal program begun in 1991 
to support innovative demonstrations of congestion pricing. Finding no takers for actual 
implementation of pricing on an entire corridor, the US Federal Highway Administration 
incorporated these “high occupancy/toll” (HOT) lanes into the program later in the 1990s. 
Indeed, HOT lanes were so much more popular than congestion pricing that the Congestion 
Pricing Pilot Program was renamed, changing “Congestion Pricing” to “Value Pricing” — a term 
originally coined to indicate product differentiation involving pricing, but one that has come to 
be used synonymously with (or euphemistically for) congestion pricing. 
  HOT lanes have spread to several other states and are prominent components of a number of 
local, state, and federal transportation plans. Poole and Orski (2003) develop a nationwide 
proposal for networks of such lanes, including considerable investments in connecting 
interchanges so that users could avoid mixing with regular traffic when changing from one HOT 
route to another. (This feature also is levered off plans for carpool lanes, which in some states 
involve similarly expensive interchanges but restricted to carpools.) Their proposal also 
incorporates bus transit vehicles. 
  HOT lanes have been joined by some additional instances of new toll roads that serve as 
congestion relievers. Toll roads have of course existed in many states, sometimes in urban areas, 
and have provided de facto product differentiation vis-à-vis non-express arterials. But recently, 
as urban areas have largely filled in their developed areas with expressway systems, new toll 
roads serve more often as alternatives not only to arterials but to other urban expressways. An 
early example just outside the US is Highway 407 in the Toronto metropolitan area, opened in 
1997 and running parallel to and just a few miles from the highly congested Queen Elizabeth 
Way. A more recent example is E-470 in Colorado, a tolled half-beltway connecting heavily 
developed suburbs north and east of Denver to each other and to Denver International Airport. 
Public opinion shows an increasing if reluctant acceptance of such ventures as sources of funding 
for needed capacity, acceptable because there are reasonably close substitutes that remain free. 
  The upshot of this activity is that people are becoming used to the idea of tolled facilities 
offering premium service. Furthermore, dramatic improvements in pricing technology, supported 
by aggressive corporate development within a dynamic and quite competitive industry, have 
made it possible to implement far more sophisticated pricing systems. Market penetration of 
electronic toll payments has reached well over half on many toll roads, and HOT-lane operators K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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increasingly offer toll schedules that assume some sophistication on the part of users. In a small 
number of cases, including HOT lanes in the San Diego and Minneapolis regions, pricing is 
“dynamic”: that is, the price is varied in real time, depending on congestion levels in the adjacent 
lanes, in order to keep the HOT lanes busy yet congestion-free. In what came as a surprise to 
many, users had little trouble adapting to dynamic pricing and it works smoothly. 
  Thus two prerequisites for road pricing — public familiarity and feasible charging 
technologies — have entered the public realm more or less by accident. In addition, 
transportation planners are by financial necessity becoming locked into systems that contain 
priced facilities. Thus it is likely that most current experiments will continue even though a 
priced facility is occasionally returned to free status, due for example to paying off a bond or to 




  Financial pressures have induced state and local authorities to seek arrangements with private 
investors to hasten the process of building capacity. There are many institutional forms of private 
involvement in road finance, ranging from financing a publicly designed road to building and 
managing the road privately. All of them involve some form of privately provided finance 
recouped by toll revenues. Usually the arrangement is specified as a franchise that spells out the 
rights to operate a toll road for a specified period of time with some limitations on tolls, toll 
increases, or the rate of return to capital. 
  Private participation in road operations is significant for policy toward congestion for several 
reasons. First, private investors, as well as financial institutions supporting them through loans, 
have a strong incentive to accurately forecast demand for the road. This raises the level of 
knowledge about impacts of a given capacity expansion on the road network, and it helps steer 
investment away from projects that benefit only a narrow interest group. 
  Second, private firms have experience with price setting and generally understand such 
important features as price sensitivity, public perceptions, marketing, and the roll of price 
differentiation. This is precisely the kind of knowledge needed to bring analytical models of 
price setting into a form that can be implemented practically. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  Third, private road operators have a financial incentive to enhance economic efficiency in 
road use, which is also the goal of standard congestion-pricing theory. It is well known in the 
academic literature that a private road operator, even one with a monopoly, will choose to 
differentiate prices by time of day in a manner very similar to that called for by standard 
congestion pricing recommendations (Small and Verhoef 2007, Section 6.1.1). This is because 
the private operator can charge higher tolls if it can provide a high level of service by keeing 
congestion down. In fact, the pricing structure that provides the greatest revenue is basically the 
same as the structure that maximizes public benefits as normally defined, although the level of 
prices may be substantially higher in the former case. For this reason, as private operators 
propose, bid on, or negotiate franchise agreements, they will tend to encourage public authorities 
to consider differentiated toll schemes that might otherwise be ruled out for simplicity, but that in 
fact can both increase revenue and help manage congestion. 
  The ability of private operators to capture benefits of improved efficiency is so strong that 
even existing toll roads have begun to have their operating rights sold by state or local 
governments to private investors. Two very large such sales occurred in recent years: the 
Chicago Skyway, owned by the City of Chicago, was franchised in 2005 and the Indiana 
Turnpike in 2006. These two road segments, which connect to each other, form parts of Interstate 
Routes 80 and 90, two major east-west corridors in the northern United States. Long-term leases 
were granted in return for up-front payments of $1.8 billion and 3.8 billion, respectively. 
Although the agreements do not specify time-of-day pricing, they do give the franchisees 
incentives to adopt road-maintenance strategies that better match user preferences. It seems only 
a matter of time before the financial advantages of price differentiation by time of day lead to 
proposals that include such differentiation. 
  Leasing an existing asset introduces some interesting issues of politics and public finance. 
The effect is usually to shift control over net revenues from a dedicated toll authority to a 
political authority, and to shift the timing of these revenues from gradual receipt over many years 
to a lump sum at the time of the lease. Whether and how this shift is accompanied by controls 
over spending the revenues can greatly affect transportation funding in current and future years.
1 
                                                 
1 The Chicago Skyway lease provided up-front funds to the City of Chicago for general use. For the Indiana 
Turnpike, authorizing legislation places the proceeds in a ten-year highway improvement fund. The Governor of 
Pennsylvania proposed to place proceeds from a lease of the Pennsylvania Turnpike in a transportation endowment 
fund of indefinite lifetime, whose earnings would support transportation improvements. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  Another interesting feature of private highways is that in several cases, private firms have 
submitted unsolicited proposals for new highways. One notable example is the proposal by a 
consortium of Fluor Enterprises and Transurban (USA) for new HOT lanes on parts of the 
Washington Beltway and Interstate 395 in Virginia. These notoriously congested roads serve 
hundreds of thousands of Washington-area users, many of whom have influential positions in 
national government. Thus direct consumer experience with private pricing proposals will to 
some extent also become experience by policy makers. What is especially relevant about 
unsolicited proposals is that the private firms are free to suggest pricing schemes that otherwise 
might never make it through a public bureaucracy. 
  Private participation in highway capacity, then, not only makes it possible to add capacity 
more quickly than could be done otherwise. It also brings with it a host of factors favoring the 
use of pricing for congestion management. Like the experiments in product differentiation 
described earlier, experiments with privately operated highways may break the impasse that 
makes congestion so intractable. 
 
Public attitudes toward road pricing and privatization 
 
  Generally, the public does not like road pricing. Most people think that free travel on roads is 
a traditional and fundamental right (although in fact turnpikes played very important roles in 
earlier centuries). Furthermore, the argument for pricing is abstract and involves offsetting the 
welfare losses directly experienced by individual users with welfare gains in the form of toll 
revenues, which users may not trust will be spent wisely.  
  Nevertheless, the various experiments and demonstrations undertaken during the last two 
decades have resulted in considerable changes in attitudes among affected users. Many people 
recognize that the private sector can deliver congestion relief sooner than the public sector and 
that paying tolls is the price of that accelerated schedule. In areas with HOT lanes, public 
acceptance has tended to rise over time, often reaching majority support. For example, before the 
HOT lanes opened in Orange County, California,  about 65% of solo drivers approved of 
providing toll lanes to manage congestion; a year later, 69% to 82% of them approved, 
depending on whether or not they used the toll lanes. Before the project, a smaller proportion of 
solo drivers, 43%, approved of varying the tolls with the severity of congestion; a year later this K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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rose to 60% of those continuing to use the free lanes and 73% of those using the toll lanes. 
(Carpoolers generally approved less of these concepts and did not show much change over time.) 
Approval of the concept of private companies operating toll roads rose among nearly all groups, 
to around 50%.
2 
  Perhaps the most surprising political development in congestion pricing is the proposal by 
New York’s Mayor Bloomberg for a cordon toll of $8 during daytime hours for entry into 
Manhattan south of 86
th Street (except for circumferential travel on designated express arterials 
at the island’s borders). Travel purely within the cordon would be priced at half that amount. 
This proposal is one of eight selected for further consideration under the US Department of 
Transportation’s “Urban Partnerships” program, which offers substantial funding for innovative 
proposals specifically including congestion pricing. Bloomberg’s proposal touched off a 
substantial political saga both in New York City, surrounding suburbs, and the New York State 
Legislature. Early press coverage suggests that two significant factors in obtaining support would 
be the availability of federal money, and the use of fees to obviate increases in existing bridge 
tolls and public transit fares.
3  
  This is not to say that experience is always positive. The governor of Indiana faced 
considerable hostility over the sale of the Indiana Turnpike, which will lead to higher tolls, 
despite the fact that a high fraction of toll payers live in other states. Similar proposals for the 
New Jersey Turnpike and the Pennsylvania Turnpike have produced strong opposition. The 
extensive private investment program undertaken by Texas, with its first concession agreement 
in June 2006 for a new $1.35 billion road, has led to a backlash that seems certain to curtail the 
extent of planned privatization.
4 
                                                 
2 These numbers are estimated from Sullivan (1998), Figures 6-1, 6-3, and 6-12. Updates in Sullivan (2000) show 
that these approval ratings subsequently dropped substantially, probably due to some controversial actions of the 
private toll operator described later. 
3 See Schaller (2006), Bindrim (2007), “Congestion Pricing Deadline” (2007). For more details of the proposal, see 
Grynbaum (2007). 
4 The Texas legislature voted overwhelmingly in May 2007  for a series of limitations including a two-year 
moratorium on new franchise agreements and restrictions on the terms that can be offered. About the same time, a 
multi-billion-dollar agreement for extension of a toll road north of Dallas was reopened to allow a competing bid by 
the public toll-road authority in the region. See “Texas Toll Moratorium Hodgepodge” (2007) and “ ‘Price Check’ 
Bid Upsets Cintra’s Texas SH 121 Deal” (2007). K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  An example illustrates how even successful instances of privatization can be reversed, and 
yet still contribute to the growth in use of tolls to manage traffic congestion. The HOT lanes 
described earlier in Orange County, California, were originally constructed and operated under a 
long-term franchise by a private consortium. As noted earlier, the deal creating these lanes was 
already unpopular in inland Riverside County, where most of its users reside. Two public-
relations snafus further eroded support for the private operation. First, the private operator made 
a clumsy attempt to reap a tax windfall by proposing to sell the lanes at a handsome profit to a 
newly created nonprofit organization, which would be eligible for tax-exempt bond financing. 
Press exposure revealed a less than fully arms-length relationship between the seller and the 
proposed purchaser. Second, severe congestion on the regular (free) lanes of the corridor 
returned more rapidly than expected following its drastic decline upon completion of the 91 
Express Lanes (which expanded capacity in the corridor by about 50 percent). When the 
California Department of Transportation attempted to add some new capacity under the guise of 
safety improvements at a merger point, the private operator invoked the non-compete clause in 
its franchise, which turned out to be one of the most restrictive ever written for a private 
highway: namely, it prohibited any such expansion and lacked the more common provision for 
compensation in case of overriding public need. The upshot was that the express-lane franchise 
was bought out in 2003 by the Orange County Transportation Authority. The sale price gave the 
private operator a healthy profit on its nearly eight-year ownership of the road, and the terms of 
the loan underwriting the public takeover ensure that pricing will remain in place for many years. 
Indeed, as of April 2007, the price has been raised several more times, making it one of the most 
expensive roads per mile of travel in the US, with a peak rate of $9.50 for the 10-mile outbound 
trip between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on Fridays.
5 
  Nevertheless, the public is getting used to road prices being among the innovations they are 
likely to see as policy makers grapple with intractable congestion. It will become increasingly 
hard to defeat pricing proposals on purely ideological grounds, forcing discussion into more 
objective consideration of actual effects. This enhances the possibility that pricing proposals with 
especially high congestion-relief benefits will get a hearing. 
                                                 
5 The toll schedule is provided at http://www.91expresslanes.com/tollschedules.asp. Generally the inbound peak 
tolls, which occur during the morning, are only about half as large as the outbound peak tolls. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  It is also important that analysts in federal, state, and local agencies are gaining experience 
with road pricing. Many such agencies have at least some staff with training in economics, and 
other staff members have grown in their ability to understand and assess analyses of economic 
efficiency. It is now quite common, even routine in some agencies, for a menu of proposals in 
urban transportation to include pricing. For example, the US Federal Highway Administration 
issues regular reports to Congress about the condition of the nation’s highway infrastructure and 
needs for investment; its 2006 report includes the following statement in bold type:  
… congestion pricing has the potential to significantly improve the operational performance 
of the Nation’s highway system, while significantly reducing the level of future capital 
investment that would be necessary to achieve any specific level of performance” (US 
FHWA 2006b, p. xi). 
 
The report goes on to estimate that reduction in needed capital investment at about $21 billion 
per year. Two decades ago, such a statement by a highly visible public agency would have been 
considered impolitic. 
  Thus both citizens and technocrats are giving pricing solutions a hearing instead of 
dismissing them out of hand. This raises the chance that a successful package can be constructed, 
one that improves efficiency by using price to lower congestion, but still provides overall 




  The movement of freight within and through urban areas has long been an important part of 
the economies of urban areas, and a significant requirement of transportation facilities. Freight is 
increasingly important to regional and national economies as trucking serves primary 
distributional roles for inter-regional and international shipments, often entering through water 
ports. The four largest US ports alone — New Orleans, Houston, New York, and Los 
Angeles/Long Beach — handled 710 million tons of traffic in 2004; one-fifth of this, valued at 
$442 billion, involved international trade.
6 Much freight traffic originating at ports travels by 
truck and/or rail via the urban infrastructure to inland destinations, some of it passing again 
                                                 
6 US Census Bureau (2006), Tables 1043, 1061. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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through urban hubs like Chicago. (The Chicago region generates an estimated 3,500 truck trips 
per day just connecting its own rail terminals, due to a shortage of connecting rail capacity.)
7 
  Trucks impose considerable environmental and safety costs in the form of air pollution 
(especially particulates, which are the most clearly documented causes of severe health effects), 
noise, and collision damage to passenger vehicles. The explosion of port activity accompanying 
recent expansion of global trade has accentuated these problems and focused many residents and 
policy makers on finding alternatives to the large truck volumes found on some urban corridors, 
such as those serving the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, California. 
  One outcome of these factors is an interest in truck-only roads or lanes, often conceived as 
new capacity to be built for the dual purposes of congestion relief and channeling truck traffic to 
where it is less harmful (Poole 2007). Usually truck-only lanes are planned as toll facilities, 
either because they are proposed for accelerated investment or simply on grounds of equity. 
Typically the trucking industry has opposed special road charges aimed at them, but it has shown 
more flexibility toward truck-only toll lanes provided they are not made mandatory by 
prohibiting trucks from other highways. Thus, the outcome of attempts to deal with special and 
growing needs of freight transportation could be another type of differentiated highway service, 
offering premium service for those freight movements for whom the faster and more reliable 
travel are worth the payments. 
  Local distributional activity by trucks also creates significant problems for the urban 
transportation system, especially congestion resulting from loading and unloading. Shippers’ 
desires for rapid and predictable deliveries, combined with carriers’ attempt to minimize labor 
costs, may lead to larger vehicles on dense city streets than would be efficient from an overall 
system point of view. Local businesses depend on such deliveries and often strongly resist 
attempts to regulate them in the interests of traffic management. This can greatly complicate the 
politics of congestion. 
 
Highway design standards 
 
                                                 
7 McCarron and LaBelle (2002), p. 1. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  The increased importance of product variety and differentiation casts doubt on some long-
standing assumptions about design standards for highways. Furthermore, some standards that 
made sense when most travel was intended to be under free-flowing conditions are inappropriate 
to high-density urban settings where congestion must and should be common even under ideal 
policies. 
  Perhaps the clearest example of problematic design standards is the US interstate highway 
system. Interstate highways are expected to meet nationwide standards for lane width, sight 
distance, grade, shoulders, and other characteristics (AASHTO 2005). But simple economics 
suggests that where land costs, construction costs, and traffic volumes are high, one should trade 
off costly features like lane widths, shoulders, and long sight distances for more capacity 
whenever possible. In other words, those design features that provide better safety and ride 
quality at high speeds become less important relative to those that increase throughput at 
moderate (congested) speeds. 
  Another way to look at this is in terms of an equilibration of travel times across different 
types of highways. When the overall capacity of an urban traffic system is in heavy use, there 
will be a tendency for higher-quality roads to become congested more severely than others until 
their levels of service are equalized. This simple equilibrium concept is exposited in a highly 
stylized form by Pigou (1920) and more generally for urban traffic by Downs (1962). To the 
extent it is valid, extra expense incurred to improve design speeds on major roads has no payoff 
during congested periods, whereas anything to improve capacity has a huge payoff. In heavily 
congested urban areas, most people experience these roads under congested, not free-flow, 
conditions and so the need for capacity should dominate the design process. 
  A simple example is lane width. The standard 12-foot-wide lanes of US interstate highways 
provide safety margins for roads carrying mixed traffic of cars and trucks at high speeds and 
often under difficult conditions of weather and terrain. On most urban commuting corridors, 
trucks are fewer and it is practical to limit speeds to well below those of intercity travel. Indeed, 
urban expressway expansions are sometimes carried out by converting some shoulders to travel 
lanes and restriping all lanes to be narrower, sometimes to an 11-foot width. But if the road has 
an interstate highway designation, exemptions are required and these may be considered 
temporary until a fuller and more expensive reconstruction can be undertaken. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  Even if pricing were in place to limit congestion, optimal speeds would be far from free-flow 
during much of the day. Keeler and Small (1977) analyze the tradeoff between capital expense 
and road capacity for congestion reduction, using construction costs and speed-flow relationships 
estimated for the San Francisco Bay Area. They find that in the two main central cities of that 
area, San Francisco and Oakland, optimal speeds during the four busiest hours would be about 
50 miles per hour with congestion pricing in place. Without pricing, the optimal speed would 
surely be lower. In today’s most congested cities, with land costs much higher than those 
observed by Keeler and Small, the optimal speed for an expressway is probably lower still. 
  Many of the aesthetic and environmental objections to urban expressways are related to their 
size and visibility, which are magnified by designs permitting safe travel at very high speeds. To 
the extent that aesthetics carry extra weight in urban areas because they affect more people, those 
considerations also argue for reducing the free-flow speed for which roads are designed. Even 
speed itself is an environmental factor due to tire and engine noise, which become so severe that 
large expenditures are sometimes undertaken for sound walls and extra sound insulation on 
nearby homes. These expenditures could be reduced by using lower-speed road design.  
  Samuel (2006) documents a wide variety of innovative ways that capacity can be added to 
urban road networks in a more environmentally and aesthetically friendly manner. These include 
advanced intersection designs and tunnels. Tunnels carry urban express traffic in Oslo, Sydney, 
and other cities and are now planned for the completion of missing links in the Long Beach 
Freeway near Los Angeles and in the A86 ring road around Paris. In the Paris case, where the 
missing section will pass under the historic palace of Versailles, the planned car-only design 
permits high capacity with 10-foot lanes, low clearances, and a 43 mi/hr speed limit (Samuel 
2006, p. 19). Tunnels are an attractive option for many urban motor vehicle movements, but the 
high cost of a large cross-section makes it especially important to plan for low speeds and limited 
vehicle sizes. 
  While exotic highway designs offer promise, conventional designs already exist for carrying 
substantial volumes at moderate speeds, in the range of 40-50 miles per hour, while presenting a 
much less obtrusive public face. Lakeshore Drive in Chicago provides service at such speeds 
most of the time while preserving the Lake Michigan lakefront as a mark of the city’s beauty. 
Storrow Drive in Boston similarly provides substantial capacity at moderate speeds without 
ruining the landscape. Neither road meets interstate highway standards, nor do they allow K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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urbanites to cross vast developed areas in an hour. Some older parkways, such as the Arroyo 
Seco in Los Angeles and the Merritt Parkway in Connecticut, similarly fall below some modern 
interstate standards and operate in an uneasy compromise, having historic scenic value (the 
Arrooyo Seco Parkway is a National Scenic Byway) but being overloaded and thus under 
pressure for safety upgrades which make them more like conventional freeways.
8 
  A few cities have moved to upgrade their major arterial streets to “superstreets,” which 
provide a level of service closer to that of limited-access highways by means of turn lanes, traffic 
signal coordination, under- or over-passes at key intersections, and the like. The most important 
(and expensive) component is improved intersections, for which a number of innovations have 
been proposed including some that conserve on land consumption (Samuel 2006, pp. 48-61). An 
important consideration of such proposals will be to demonstrate they are safer than conventional 
arterials, which have substantially higher accident rates than freeways. 
  Many of the roads built to such intermediate standards do not accommodate large trucks. 
Indeed, evidence suggests that accommodating trucks adds 30 to 60 percent to the cost of an 
urban road.
9 For tunnels, the savings are potentially larger because a given cross-sectional area 
can handle two to three times as many lanes for cars as for mixed traffic (Poole and Sugimoto 
1995, Fig. 1). A move to make lower-profile roads a larger portion of our high-capacity road 
network will undoubtedly raise objection from truckers, who like to maintain full routing 
flexibility. But trucks are a minority of traffic, especially during rush hours, and their needs add 
greatly to the aesthetic and environmental problems of roads that carry them. It simply does not 
make sense to build the entire network around trucks. Instead, it is better to apply the principle of 
differentiated products and provide some roads well suited to trucks and others well suited to 
handling massive peaked flows of passengers. 
                                                 
8 The Arroyo Seco Parkway, opened in stages between 1938 and 1953, was originally considered a model of safety 
with its 11-foot lanes and 45 mi/hr speed limit. Renamed the Pasadena Freeway after various upgrades, it now 
carries nearly five times its original design volume and, with its original tight curves but a speed limit of 55 mi/hr, is 
one of the most accident-prone of Southern California freeways. A community task force in the 1990s spearheaded 
its designation as a National Scenic Byway and recommended a return to the original speed limit. See Loukaitou-
Sideris and Gottlieb (2003). 
9 Meyer, Kain and Wohl (1965, pp. 204-206) present data suggesting that a cars-only expressway would cost 77 
percent of a mixed-traffic expressway (as calculated by Keeler and Small 1977, p. 8). Dehnert and Prevedouros 
(2004) find that an underpass at an arterial intersection costs 61 percent of one that accommodates trucks, mainly 
due to shorter length and lower clearance.  K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  Thus an important part of making future cities livable is to provide mobility through designs 
that are both aesthetically and economically sensible. An interesting byproduct would be that 
even when providing the same level of service, such roads would be perceived as only 
moderately rather than severely congested — simply because there would be a smaller gap 
between actual and potential speed. The most common measure of time lost in congestion is 
precisely this gap (Schrank and Lomax 2005); by this measure, the quickest way to reduce 
congestion would be to lower the speed limit on all expressways! That of course would be 
perceived as artificial, but road designs that carry current traffic volumes in a more aesthetic 
manner might indeed be perceived as providing better service (i.e. less deteriorated due to 
congestion) even if at the same speed as now. 
  Research on the comparative costs of high-capacity roads designed for different speeds and 
vehicle sizes is needed before any firm recommendation can be made. Equally pressing is a 
better understanding of their safety implications. But safety depends on many factors besides 
road designs, leading to a further question. If roads are designed to be safe only at moderate 
speeds, can we prevent people from choosing higher speeds and thereby compromising their own 
and others’ safety? Attempts to retain the scenic character of the Arroyo Seco Parkway, 
mentioned earlier, have foundered partly on this problem. Rather than simply accept driver 
behavior as given, we should consider what public policies might be undertaken, in conjunction 
with road design changes, to encourage compatible driver behavior. One such policy is to 
introduce visual clues that cause drivers to slow down. Another is to regulate speed (or other 
behavior) differently from how it is done today. We now consider this latter approach in more 
detail. 
 
Regulation of driver behavior 
 
  Imagine a visitor from another planet with a highly organized society possessing 
technologies similar to ours. Governments on this planet provide a variety of transportation 
services, facing similar tradeoffs between cost and quality as we do. They provide mass 
transportation in scheduled vehicles, and also more individualized transportation in vehicles 
carrying one person or a small number of people traveling together. The planet’s residents K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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undergo occasional tragic accidents, just as we do, but they affect only a small proportion of trips 
and are accepted as one of the costs of living, albeit one they try constantly to reduce. 
  You might think this visitor would feel quite at home in any of Earth’s developed countries. 
But the visitor is struck by a disparity that seems incomprehensible. Although our rail and air 
transportation is carefully organized with elaborate attention to coordination among vehicles, our 
personal vehicles are subject to no such control other than some very rudimentary signal lights 
(roughly the same technology introduced on railroads in the early 1900s). Could it be, the visitor 
wonders, that Earth has substituted intensive driver training of all its citizens for the 
technological measures with which this other planet manages its many small vehicles? Inquiry 
reveals that no, we lack such training; indeed, the disparity of habits and methods used by our 
drivers is quite astounding. How could it be that with such advanced technology we have failed 
to apply it to reduce the rate of accidents and traffic interferences that differentiate our highways 
from the smoothly functioning system familiar to our visitor? 
  The answer presumably lies in political attitudes, social norms, and the history of our 
highway transportation system. We in fact have the technology to carry out many forms of driver 
regulation that would reduce accidents and improve traffic flow. Speed “governors” have been 
used on certain rental vehicles for decades. Controlled braking has become standard equipment 
on many vehicles, and gap control between vehicles is now offered on many models as an option 
to reduce rear-end collisions. Mobile communications, used for toll collection and driver 
information and guidance, would make it possible to activate such devices according to a 
centralized traffic-management plan. 
  Such centralized control would assuredly come at considerable cost. But not necessarily 
more so than current systems, such as route guidance, that are rapidly gaining in open markets. 
Furthermore, the cost of a centralized system of vehicle management is unknown because no one 
has seriously proposed it. Drivers’ choice of speed, acceleration, lane movements, and expressive 
gestures (up to a point) have traditionally been viewed as part of freedom of movement, and 
controls on them would likely be derided as “social engineering”. 
  Yet it seems quite possible that such controls would permit just the kind of more favorable 
tradeoffs discussed in the previous subsection, by which capacity could be increased while 
limiting the accompanying land consumption and aesthetic impact, not to mention the pollution 
and fuel consumption resulting from thousands of vehicles all trying to gain an edge on each K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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other in the competition for road space. Specifically, it seems the main factor preventing more 
widespread acceptance of curved, narrow-lane highways is that they are considered unsafe. 
Enforceable limits on speed and lane-change maneuvers would reduce or eliminate this 
disadvantage while increasing the maximum throughput possible on a given pavement. 
  Clearly, any such proposal today would face a skeptical reaction at best. But might we see 
such a change in attitudes in the future, even in a nation devoted to individual freedom? I think it 
is possible. People accept considerable intrusion into their freedom of movement in the interests 
of security (airport check-in procedures), safety (drunk-driver laws), and, as already argued, 
optional premium service (tolled express lanes). They also accept data collection on their 
movements when it suits their convenience (mobile phones, credit-card records, electronic toll 
collection). What is needed is a demonstration of direct, perceptible benefits from accepting 
moderate limitations. One way to accomplish this would be to construct optional, premium-
service roadways available only to vehicles equipped so as to be part of a traffic management 
system including speed control. 
  An important byproduct of such an innovation would be improvements in our record of 
motor-vehicle crashes. Although large gains have been made in terms of reducing crash rates 
(per vehicle-mile traveled), motor-vehicle accidents remain one of the largest categories of costs 
of driving: $0.12 per vehicle-mile by one estimate, about one-seventh of total short-run average 
variable cost for a typical US urban rush-hour work trip including the cost of travel time, 
unreliability, and vehicle capital.
10 Indeed, it appears that driving is the most dangerous activity 
undertaken regularly by most people. A public-relations campaign that demonstrates both safety 
and congestion-relief benefits from a program of voluntary limitations on driver behavior could 




  Public transit in the US plays a key role in supporting large employment clusters, serving 
lower-income populations, facilitating tourism, and helping selected markets. But it carries far 
                                                 
10 The cost estimates are from Small and Verhoef (2007, table 3.3). The rate of motor vehicle accidents per million 
vehicle-miles declined from 11.7 in 1980 to 3.7 in 2004, during which time the rate of traffic fatalities (within 30 
days of an accident) fell from 0.033 to 0.014: US Census Bureau (2006, Tables 1080, 1082). K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
revised June 2007  Prepared for: Unraveling the Urban Enigma: City Prospects, City Policies  
19 
fewer people than automobiles, and its share of trips has declined inexorably since the years soon 
after World War II. The main reasons for this decline appear to be rising incomes and the 
widespread decentralization of employment and residences; secondary but still important reasons 
include strong federal support for the Interstate Highway System, tax and housing policies that 
favor single-family residences, zoning restrictions on high-density housing, tax policies favoring 
free or highly subsidized parking at workplaces, low gasoline taxes compared to most developed 
nations, and little explicit pricing of highways. Kain (1999) and Small and Gómez-Ibáñez (1999) 
describe these factors in more detail. 
  A lot of money has been put into transit service in the last half century. Much of it is 
motivated by a desire to use transit to lure drivers off congested highways. In the US, these 
efforts have met with very limited success. But even where successful in diverting auto users, 
expansion of transit has not been the hoped-for solution to congestion. A primary reason for this 
is the existence of “latent demand” for peak-period road use in large and highly congested urban 
areas. Many people have been deterred by congestion itself from traveling when and where they 
would most prefer. Whenever new road space is opened up by a successful diversion to transit, 
some of the latent demand becomes again realized, tending to fill up the road space. The result is 
only small, if any, improvement in peak conditions, although there may be substantial benefits to 
the individuals involved. 
  There is little prospect that public transit will ever return to being a dominant force in urban 
transportation in the US. But there are several ways in which its use can be expanded and its 
value can be raised. These changes in turn would raise the attractiveness of cities as places to live 




  The same forces of differentiation discussed in connection with highway transportation affect 
public transit as well. The markets served by transit are very different from each other. Probably 
its two most important markets are affluent suburbanites traveling to downtown business 
destinations and poor residents traveling within inner cities (Meyer and Gómez-Ibáñez 1981). 
This differentiation in markets creates a need for more differentiation of products. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  That need is accentuated by the strong scale economies that characterize scheduled services 
in large vehicles, as demonstrated by Mohring (1972). These economies arise from two sources: 
savings in operator costs if vehicles become more fully utilized, and savings in user costs 
associated with accessing transit vehicles if service is increased. These user costs include 
walking or driving to transit stops, waiting for a vehicle, and making transfers between transit 
lines — all of which can decreased, if more vehicles are in service within a given area, by 
increasing the spatial density of transit lines and the frequency of service on each line. 
  These scale economies arise from higher rider density within a given area. As a result, 
standard transit service is well suited for offering frequent and densely packed service in areas 
with high rider density, but is poorly suited to offer service where rider density is low.  
  Thus product differentiation and scale economies lead to a common conclusion: transit 
operators should specialize. They should seek their strongest markets and pour intensive 
resources into them, including marketing resources and supportive political actions such as high-
density zoning near large transit stations. Weaker markets should not be served at all, or should 
be served mostly using some model other than regularly scheduled vehicles. 
  Unfortunately, trends since the 1950s have been in the opposite direction (Wachs 1989, 
Garrett and Taylor 1999). Many transit agencies today are large, multi-jurisdictional 
conglomerates subject to bureaucratic and political pressures to homogenize their service. To a 
large extent this is a byproduct of the public takeovers of financially failing private firms 
following the precipitous decline in ridership in the 1950s and 1960s, as ownership of single-
family homes and automobiles surged. Such takeovers were often accompanied by consolidation 
of several transit systems into a single large one. The result has been metropolitan-wide transit 
authorities which, in order to achieve the necessary political support in widely dispersed 
jurisdictions, have tried to offer at least rudimentary service everywhere. This is just the opposite 
of specialization. 
  Of course, abandoning low-density markets will raise strong protests, some of them pointing 
to inequities and harm to particular disadvantaged groups. Indeed, these markets often contain 
groups — including poor, physically handicapped, and elderly residents who cannot feasibly use 
private automobile — that society apparently deems worth supporting even at considerable cost. 
Finding a type of transit appropriate to such groups has proven a challenge. Demand-responsive 
transit, consisting of small buses or vans dispatched according to pre-arranged requests, is one K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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way, but it has been very expensive and in the US has largely become a service solely for elderly 
and handicapped. New dispatching algorithms may be helping these services, and has been 
demonstrated even for general use in a few sites in Europe.
11 In many situations, shared-ride taxi 
service would be a relatively economical approach if institutional barriers can be overcome. 
  The point is that serving low-volume markets with standard scheduled service is very costly 
and not an economical way to take care of special needs. Even offering free or highly subsidized 
taxi service to target populations would often be less expensive. Meanwhile, by focusing service 
on those markets where demand is strong, transit operators can take advantage of scale 
economies and create the kind of frequent service and dense route coverage that can entice 
people to view public transit as a real alternative to private automobiles, rather than as an 
occasional convenience. 
 
Role of buses 
 
  A focus on high-density markets raises the question of the appropriate type of transit vehicle. 
Large cities worldwide have, of course, found rail transit to be a vital part of their transportation 
system. But does rail transit make sense for the second tier of city sizes or, in the largest cities, 
for service in lower-density suburbs? 
  Many cost studies over the last 40 years have compared the costs of rail transit with those of 
other modes providing similar service (Small and Gómez-Ibáñez 1999). They have found that for 
nearly all situations in the US where rail transit does not already exist, buses can provide 
essentially the same amount of service as rail at far less cost. These arguments have been 
instrumental in a few cases in causing city governments to scale back ambitious rail plans, for 
example Honolulu in the 1970s and Houston in the 1980s. Yet these decisions tend to be 
reversed later (Houston opened a light rail system in 2004). Meanwhile many cities large and 
                                                 
11 Computer-aided demand-responsive bus scheduling through a travel dispatch center was implemented through the 
European Union’s SAMPLUS research program in several areas, including at least one that is open to all residents 
of a moderate-density urban site: Porto Romana (population density 3,600/sq km) in the Florence metropolitan area. 
The Porto Romana service uses flexible routes with predefined stop points and reported an operating cost of 
€1.69/trip, not including the dispatch center (Mageean and Nelson 2003). Other demonstration sites had much 
higher costs per ride, possibly because of lower density of users. 
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small, serving areas dense and not so dense, have opted for rail systems. There are many reasons: 
pressures from private interest groups such as downtown landowners, desire to enhance a city’s 
public image, advantages of rail in terms of comfort and convenience to users, and support from 
federal grants. 
  Recent innovations in the design of bus transit have to some extent overcome each of these 
reasons for preferring a more expensive rail system. These innovations are loosely known as 
“bus rapid transit,” designating a variety of initiatives giving bus transit some of the 
characteristics usually associated with rail. These characteristics include specialized boarding 
stations, off-vehicle fare payment, fixed and well publicized routes, real-time information at 
stations, restricted rights of way, preferential signal timing, low-emitting vehicles powered by 
electricity or natural gas, and marketing. 
  The prototype bus rapid transit system is that of Curitiba, Brazil, which carries close to 2 
million passengers daily. Larger South American cities, including Sao Paulo (Brazil) and Bogotá 
(Columbia), have also built major systems —  Sao Paulo runs 400 buses per hour during the peak 
and carries over 30,000 passengers per hour (International Energy Agency 2002). There are also 
substantial long-standing exclusive busways operating in Ottawa and Pittsburgh, and a new line 
in Los Angeles with grade-level intersections that opened in 2005. 
  Several cities in the US and Canada have recently designated new bus rapid transit lines as 
upgrades to existing bus routes. Early results on two Los Angeles lines showed increases in 
average travel speed of roughly 25 percent, to about 14 mi/hr on the busy Wilshire corridor 
(Levinson et al. 2003, Section III.B); express service (stopping only at selected locations) was 
subsequently introduced on Wilshire to provide a faster option. In Vancouver, three regular bus 
routes were upgraded to “rapid bus transit” status between 1996 and 2002, also achieving a 
reported overall speed of 14 mi/hr in two cases (“BRT at TRB” 2005) . The move to bus rapid 
transit connects also to privatization: recent federal legislation has created the “Public-Private 
Partnership Pilot Program,” affectionately known as Penta-P, which will consider proposals for 
bus rapid transit from Houston and Atlanta.
12 
                                                 
12 “Federal transit gets back on the PPP track” (2007). Interest in bus rapid transit is now worldwide; see for 
example the thirteen papers in Journal of Public Transportation Special Edition: BRT  (2006). As just one example, 
Sydney, Adelaide, and Brisbane in Australia have reported travel-time savings of 37% and higher, substantial 
patronage growth, and perhaps even a positive effect on adjacent property values from introducing bus rapid transit 
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  What these experiments have in common is an attempt to focus resources on a small number 
of bus lines in order to dramatically improve their level of service. This focus mimics what 
happens when a new rail line is built. It is also exactly what is called for by the specialized 
markets and the scale economies that characterize urban transit. Bus rapid transit therefore offers 
a promising prospect for making public transit an economical yet vital part of urban life in an 




  Two features of urban transit create a strong case for subsidizing it (Kerin 1992). The first is 
the scale economies characterizing transit costs when user costs are included, as already 
described. When average cost declines as a function of usage, each new user costs less than the 
average to the overall system (including other users), so it makes sense to encourage such users 
with fares set below average cost. The other feature is the underpricing of peak-hour automobile 
travel, which is a substitute mode for public transit. This underpricing creates an inefficient 
amount of traffic congestion; thus setting transit fares below cost, especially during peak periods, 
may be desirable to entice drivers off congested highways. Small and Verhoef (2007, section 
4.5.1) provide a more formal treatment of these two arguments for transit subsidies. 
  Working against the case for subsidizing transit is the strong evidence that a large portion of 
transit subsidies has been absorbed in higher costs to transit agencies (Pickrell 1983, Lave 1991, 
De Borger and Kerstens 2000). Much of the higher costs have been in the form of higher wages, 
mainly for drivers through union negotiations. One might regard this type of higher cost as a 
transfer payment and so not strictly a social cost, although it is socially wasteful if it results in 
using higher-skilled workers than needed for the job. But to the extent that subsidy payments are 
funded by taxes with adverse effects on economic efficiency, even transfer payments exact a 
cost. Furthermore, some of the higher costs are the in the form of less efficient operations, more 
administrative overhead, and a bias toward a higher-than-efficient ratio of capital to other inputs 
in producing transit services. 
  Thus transit subsidies pose a dilemma: there are sound economic reasons for subsidies, yet 
too much of them may be wasted in unnecessary expenditures.  K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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  A possible resolution to this dilemma is offered by the tentative moves toward more pricing 
of highways, discussed earlier. Quantitative evidence suggests that of the two rationales for 
transit subsidies just described, diverting drivers from congested roads justifies much larger 
subsidies than scale economies (Van Dender and Proost 2004, Parry and Small 2007). If 
congested roads are priced at marginal cost, the rationale based on congested roads disappears. In 
a world with road pricing, it therefore may be possible to offer efficient transit service even 
while greatly reducing current transit subsidies.  
  Small (2004) provides an example of how a “virtuous circle” can magnify the positive effect 
that road pricing has on transit use, using congestion charging in central London as an example. 
An immediate impact of road pricing is, of course, to divert drivers to public transit as a 
substitute mode. This then creates a cycle of new impacts. First, the new riders provide new fare 
revenue for the transit operator. Second, the transit operator can now economically expand 
service offerings to handle the new ridership, which in turn reduces user costs for existing riders. 
Third, new riders are attracted by better service offerings, creating additional rounds of service 
improvements and diverting yet more drivers from congested roads. (This latter diversion is not 
necessarily a net social benefit, since now those roads are priced and so the diversion entails lost 
revenue; but it does support the goal of reducing road congestion.) At the same time, where 
transit vehicles share street space with cars, reduced congestion improves service quality and 
substantially reduces labor costs. Over a longer period, the changes in transit use can also 
encourage land-use changes in the form of transit-friendly development, thereby extending the 
number of people for whom transit is an attractive service. 
  Thus, congestion pricing on roads supports not only goals of congestion relief but also of 
transit finance. Furthermore, road pricing makes it economical to increase transit service; this 
stands in contrast to attempts to increase transit service as a mechanism to divert auto drivers, 
which tends to falter by inducing a realization of latent demand, as described earlier. One could 
say that rather than looking to transit to solve problems of highway congestion, a task to which it 
is inadequate, we should look to road pricing as a way of resolving the financial dilemmas of 
public transit! Happily, it does this as a byproduct of its main function, which is to efficiently 
reduce road congestion. 
  A more prosaic solution is to structure subsidies to minimize adverse effects on operating 
costs. One way to do this is “user-side subsidies”: calculate subsidies based on the number of K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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users rather than on costs of serving them. This is equivalent to giving the subsidies in the form 
of payment to users, for example a stated amount per ride. The operator then has an incentive to 




  Transit operations have recently been subjected to numerous experiments aimed at using the 
private sector to improve performance. Here, I discuss the main categories and a few examples; 
Nash (2005) and Karlaftis (2007) offer more thorough reviews. 
  A simple form of privatization is contracting out. The public authority retains control over 
what services are offered, but some of those services are delegated to private firms under specific 
contractual terms. For example, London Transport contracted with private bus operators as part 
of British bus deregulation during the 1980s. This approach has also been used in Santiago, Chile 
(Gwilliam 2005), and in Bogotá, Columbia (Estache and Gómez-Lobo 2005). Contracting out 
has been used extensively in the US since the late 1970s (Frick, Taylor, and Wachs 2007), 
Australia since the early 19990s, and many other nations. Most such contracts have proceeded 
relatively smoothly, although there are some notable exceptions such as Melbourne, Australia, 
where financial failures and poor service have been attributed by at least one observer to poorly 
structured incentives in the contracts (Mees 2005). 
  Going somewhat further, the public authority can franchise some of these services by 
licensing private firms to operate them under less specific guidelines. Performance goals may be 
mandated or encouraged through incentives, including the prospect for favorable consideration 
for later renewal of the franchise. Such franchises are usually controversial; they allow more 
room for private initiative than contracting out, but they also are subject to contract disputes, 
strategic renegotiations, and abandonment of obligations by a financially failing firm. 
  Most examples of franchising in public transportation have been for regional rail service, 
notably in the UK and Sweden. However, starting in 2003 the London Underground has 
franchised the maintenance and upgrading of its infrastructure and vehicles to two private 
companies —  over the strenuous objections of the Mayor of London and his Commissioner for 
Transport and also leading to some safety problems.
13 As with many franchising arrangements, a 
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big motivation for the London Underground private initiative was to accelerate a capital 
improvement program that, by all accounts, was urgently needed due to years of under-funding 
under public operation. 
  Going further still, the public authority can simply turn over certain transit-service markets to 
private industry. The industry may be regulated like other public utilities, or it may be opened to 
free entry on the assumption that competition will produce a desirable result just as for other 
goods in a largely market economy. Just as with other businesses serving the public, regulatory 
oversight over such things as safety and financial disclosure can be maintained. Urban bus transit 
in Great Britain outside of London was deregulated in the 1980s, as was transit service in New 
Zealand in the early 1990s. 
  Because of scale economies, it is likely that service in a given area will be provided by just 
one or a few firms, even in a privatized system. Will the mere threat of entry cause incumbent 
firms to act competitively? The limited empirical evidence suggests not. For example, Evans 
(1988) describes the experience in Hereford, England, where transit service was deregulated 
beginning in 1981. There was brief period of intense competition, but then the dominant firm 
drove out all its rivals except in one small segment of its market. Fares ultimately returned nearly 
to the levels that prevailed prior to the experiment, although service levels remained substantially 
higher — perhaps a remnant of effectiveness of threat of entry. 
  Many researchers have investigated whether private or public firms operate more efficiently. 
The results are ambiguous (Karlaftis 2007). It appears that the key to efficiency is well-
structured management incentives, and that these can be achieved under either public or private 
ownership at least in some circumstances. The US is somewhat behind the rest of the world in 
undertaking the more thorough-going types of privatization of public transit, which may be a 
problem because some observers have argued strenuously that US institutions cause its public 
transit operations to be especially inefficient (Winston and Shirley 1998). As experience 
accumulates, it should be possible to use private firms in appropriate ways to improve the 
efficiency of transit. 
 
Conclusion: A road map for urban transportation policy 
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  Policy makers can take advantage of the shifting terrain on which urban transportation 
operates through a number of steps. Taking any of them will help. Taking all of them would 
inaugurate a revolutionary change that would greatly improve urban life. 
 
1.  Encourage highway pricing innovations. In some cases, the direct benefits of a specific 
measure are not very large. For example, models of priced express lanes suggest that when the 
express lanes are kept operating at free-flow speeds, the net benefits are small compared to 
letting the same lanes operate as general-purpose lanes (Small and Yan 2001, Verhoef and Small 
2004). But such express-lane innovations are typically improvements over the actual situation 
preceding them, which usually involved less capacity or express lanes restricted to carpools. 
Furthermore, these innovations are leading to more thorough-going proposals, including 
proposals to price all lanes in a corridor. 
 
2.  Expand highway pricing to an entire corridor or area. The same evidence just mentioned 
suggests that a fully priced corridor offers much greater benefits than a partially priced corridor. 
This remains true even if the price is set lower than optimal to meet political goals (Small, 
Winston and Yan 2006). Furthermore, cordon pricing of an entire downtown business district, 
along the lines of London and Stockholm, may be possible in a few US cities with dense 
downtowns, such as Manhattan, San Francisco, and Washington. 
 
3.  Seek better tradeoffs between efficiency and public appeal for pricing schemes. Small, 
Winston and Yan (2006) study a series of pricing policies for a freeway corridor with express 
lanes. The pure express-lane policies tend to have small net benefits, whereas optimal congestion 
pricing has large benefits but high prices that inhibit public support. They offer a policy that 
prices all lanes, at differential rates, with the lower-priced lanes at a low rate designed to strictly 
limit the direct costs incurred by users. This type of policy may be the compromise needed to 
enable pricing to extend beyond just a few selected express lanes. 
 
4.  Encourage private participation in highways with good franchise terms. Private highway 
finance has entered the US in a big way, but most of it is for conventional toll roads. If franchise 
terms are made flexible, bidders will find ways to use flexible pricing to everyone’s advantage. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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Innovative private operations will involve firms taking on demand risk, so it is important to give 
them enough pricing flexibility to have some control over this risk. Regulation is still needed, but 
with a soft touch — allowing latitude for price differentiation while regulating overall revenues 
(or profits) to avoid abuse of monopoly power. 
 
5.  Pursue highway designs that emphasize high capacity at moderate speeds and with an 
environmentally friendly footprint. Urban road designers should be allowed to sacrifice free-flow 
speed and ability to handle large vehicles in favor of high throughput of passenger vehicles. If 
curves or lane widths present safety hazards at high speeds, they should be encouraged to offer 
options in which electronic speed control on these corridors is used in return for fast and reliable 
service. 
 
6.  Encourage niche transit. Private entrepreneurs have proven very adept at finding profitable 
transit markets, even when it is illegal for them to do so (Cervero 1997). Public transit authorities 
should be forced to encourage such competition with their systems, rather than to outlaw them or 
to drive them out of business using predatory tactics, as happened in Los Angeles in the early 
1980s (Teal and Nemer 1986).  
 
7.  Break up large metro-wide transit providers by spinning off those serving lower-density 
areas. Low-density transit service is a drag on the finances of big-city transit operators. There 
may be reasons to subsidize such service, but any such decision needs to be taken on its merits 
and not as part of a quid pro quo for keeping the larger operator afloat. Services for low densities 
and for populations with special needs should look quite different from regular transit service, 
typically involving small vehicles with flexible scheduling, and therefore need not be provided 
by the same agency. 
 
8.  Configure federal capital-grant programs to encourage bus rapid transit. Currently the US 
Department of Transportation is doing just this, but it is a political decision that can easily 
change. Legislators tend to like big visible projects to showcase their accomplishments, and rail 
has served this purpose but at great expense. Meanwhile many US bus operations are starved for K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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funds. Bus rapid transit offers a solution by making visible and attractive improvements at 
modest cost. 
 
9.  Use open-ended user-side subsidies to improve incentives for public providers to control 
costs. Transit policy is caught on the horns of a dilemma, by which needed subsidies are hijacked 
through union wage increases and/or operator inefficiencies. One way to lessen this tendency is 
to make the subsidies proportional to ridership, thereby forcing the agency to do everything it 
can to keep riders happy. K. Small  Urban Transportation Policy: A Guide and Road Map 
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